Double Auction enables decentralized transfer of goods between multiple buyers and sellers, thus underpinning functioning of many online marketplaces. Buyers and sellers compete in these markets through bidding, but do not often know their own valuation a-priori. As the allocation and pricing happens through bids, the profitability of participants, hence sustainability of such markets, depends crucially on learning respective valuations through repeated interactions. We initiate the study of Double Auction markets under bandit feedback on both buyers' and sellers' side. We show with confidence bound based bidding, and'Average Pricing' there is an efficient price discovery among the participants.

As the housing market stalls, Zillow's CEO sees AI as "an ingredient rather than a threat" that can both help the company protect its turf and reinvent how people search for homes. This will not be a banner year for the real estate app Zillow. "We describe the home market as bouncing along the bottom," CEO Jeremy Wacksman said in our conversation this week. Last year was dismal for the real estate market, and he expects things to improve only marginally in 2026. "The way to think about it is that there were 4.1 million existing homes sold last year--a normal market is 5.5 to 6 million," Wacksman says.

We show with confidence bound based bidding, and'Average Pricing' there

We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving a moral hazard: sellers can either faithfully deliver goods after receiving payment, or not. Although the buyer does not know a seller's true type, the platform maintains a reputation system that probabilistically assigns binary reputation signals. Buyers make purchase decisions based on reputation signals, which influence the payoffs to sellers who then adapt their type over time. These market dynamics ultimately shape the platform's profit from commissions on sales. Our analysis reveals that platforms inherently have an incentive for rating inflation, driven by the desire to increase commission. This introduces a second layer of moral hazard: the platform's incentive to distort reputations for its own profit. Such distortion is self-limited by the platform's need to maintain enough accuracy that trustworthy sellers remain in the market, without which rational buyers would refrain from purchases altogether. Nonetheless, the optimal strategy for the platform can be to invest in order to reduce signal accuracy. When the platform can freely set commission fees, however, maximum profit may be achieved by costly investment in an accurate reputation system. These findings highlight the intricate tensions between platform incentives and resulting social utility for marketplace participants.

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013). Prior work has established that fully-substitutable preferences guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria which can be centrally computed. Our motivation comes from the fact that prices in markets such as over-the-counter markets and used car markets arise from \textit{decentralized} negotiation among agents, which has left open an important question as to whether equilibrium prices can emerge from agent-to-agent bilateral negotiations. We design a best response dynamic intended to capture such negotiations between market participants. We assume fully substitutable preferences for market participants. In this setting, we provide proofs of convergence for sparse markets ({covering many real world markets of interest}), and experimental results for more general cases, demonstrating that prices indeed reach equilibrium, quickly, via bilateral negotiations. Our best response dynamic, and its convergence behavior, forms an important first step in understanding how decentralized markets reach, and retain, equilibrium.

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

Vehicular Metaverses are developed to enhance the modern automotive industry with an immersive and safe experience among connected vehicles and roadside infrastructures, e.g., RoadSide Units (RSUs). For seamless synchronization with virtual spaces, Vehicle Twins (VTs) are constructed as digital representations of physical entities. However, resource-intensive VTs updating and high mobility of vehicles require intensive computation, communication, and storage resources, especially for their migration among RSUs with limited coverages. To address these issues, we propose an attribute-aware auction-based mechanism to optimize resource allocation during VTs migration by considering both price and non-monetary attributes, e.g., location and reputation. In this mechanism, we propose a two-stage matching for vehicular users and Metaverse service providers in multi-attribute resource markets. First, the resource attributes matching algorithm obtains the resource attributes perfect matching, namely, buyers and sellers can participate in a double Dutch auction (DDA). Then, we train a DDA auctioneer using a generative pre-trained transformer (GPT)-based deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithm to adjust the auction clocks efficiently during the auction process. We compare the performance of social welfare and auction information exchange costs with state-of-the-art baselines under different settings. Simulation results show that our proposed GPT-based DRL auction schemes have better performance than others.

Bargaining is an important and unique part of negotiation between humans. As LLM-driven agents learn to negotiate and act like real humans, how to evaluate agents' bargaining abilities remains an open problem. For the first time, we formally described the Bargaining task as an asymmetric incomplete information game, defining the gains of the Buyer and Seller in multiple bargaining processes. It allows us to quantitatively assess an agent's performance in the Bargain task. We collected a real product price dataset, AmazonHistoryPrice, and conducted evaluations of various LLM agents' bargaining abilities. We find that playing a Buyer is much harder than a Seller, and increasing model size can not effectively improve the Buyer's performance. To address the challenge, we propose a novel approach called OG-Narrator that integrates a deterministic Offer Generator to control the price range of Buyer's offers, and an LLM Narrator to create natural language sentences for generated offers. Experimental results show that OG-Narrator improves the buyer's deal rates from 26.67% to 88.88% and brings a ten times multiplication of profits on all baselines, even a model that has not been aligned.